UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-14-2012

State v. Bergerud Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39284

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Bergerud Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39284" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1155.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1155

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
DANIEL WALTER BERGERUD,
Defendant-Appellant.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
KATHLEEN GAY BERGERUD,

CASE NOS. 39284 & 39286
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE JOHN P. LUSTER
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
1.S.B. #5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
P.0. Box 83720

JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
l.S.B. #6406
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................... 12
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 13
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To
Permit The Bergeruds From Inquiring Into Mr. Jones's
Character For Truthfulness Or Untruthfulness .............................................. 13
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 17
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................. 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82 ( 1993) .................................................................. 13
State v. Downing, 128 Idaho 149 (Ct. App. 1996) .............................................. 13
State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786 (Ct. App. 2012) ..................................................... 16
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 (1989) ........................................................ 13, 15
State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573 (1981) .................. ., ........................................... 16

l.R.

608(b) ................................................................................................. 13, 15

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daniel Bergerud (hereinafter, Daniel) and Kathleen Bergerud (hereinafter,
Kathleeen) appeal from their judgments of conviction for multiple drugs offenses.
Daniel was found guilty of trafficking

in metharnphetamine by manufacturing,

manufacture of a controlled substance where a child is present, possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, conspiracy to
traffic in methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a
controlled substance, marjjuana. Kathleen was found guilty of the same offenses, as
well as possession of a controlled substance, psilocybin. They assert that the district
court abused its discretion by refusing to permit them to inquire into a witness' character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Following a search of their residence, Daniel and Kathleen were each charged
with trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing, manufacture of a controlled
substance where a child is present, possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to

manufacture

methamphetamine,

conspiracy

to

traffic

in

methamphetamine,

possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, and
possession of a controlled substance, psilocybin.

(R., pp.113, 125.)

The following

evidence was introduced at trial.
On July 15, 2010, Eric Hildebrandt, a sergeant with the Kootenai County Sheriff's
Department began an investigation of the Bergerud residence.

(Tr., p.51, Ls.11-15.)

He went through the garbage cans outside of the residence and found:
1

Two soda pop cans that had been manufactured or modified into what I
believed were marijuana pipes. Basically, they took a soda can, punched
holes through it, and there was burnt residue around the edges indicating
they had been smoked with; also found a plastic tube and some file that
had been burnt in foil, a common form of paraphernalia for meth use.
I found several boxes of match books where the striker plates had been
removed from the match books, which is an indicator of manufacturing
methamphetamine. They use the striker plates to obtain the phosphorus,
which is a compound used in manufacturing methamphetamine.
(Tr.

p.54, Ls.4-19.)

He also found mail addressed to both Daniel and Kathleen.

(Tr. p.54, Ls.21-22.)

Sergeant Hildebrandt used this information to secure a search

1

1

warrant. (Tr., p.60, Ls.15-20.)
The search warrant was executed on July 22, 2010, at approximately 5:20 in the
evening. (Tr.I p.61, Ls.9-15.) Upon their entry into the residence! the officers contacted
Daniel in the basement. (Tr., p.62, Ls.17-23.) The Bergeruds' daughter and a friend
were located in the back yard.

(Tr., p.63, Ls.7-22.)

Kathleen arrived home around

10:00 pm that evening. (Tr., p.64 Ls.19-20.) Approximately 3 hours after the execution
1

of the warrant, the officers secured a second warrant, which was a "meth lab warrant,"
which was processed by the Idaho State Police. (Tr., p.65, Ls.8-13.)
During their search of the residence, officers found plant material that they
recognized as mushrooms and marijuana. (Tr., p.73, Ls.1-6.) They also encountered a
"strong chemical odor."

(Tr., p.95, Ls.10-11.)

Sergeant Hildebrandt associated this

odor with the smell of a methamphetamine lab.

(Tr., p.95, Ls.18-21.)

Sergeant

Hildebrandt also testified about finding evidence of, "continual, repetitive purchases of
ephedrine, which is unusual for an average person who purchases ephedrine for cold
medicine or things of that nature."

(Tr., p.105, Ls.18-24.)

The State introduced

documentation indicating that 2500 pills were purchased by the Bergeruds between
January, 2009, and July, 2010.

(Tr., p.198, Ls.2-4.)
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However, no red phosphorus,

gasoline, antifreeze, rock salt, hydrogen peroxide, scales, or bindles were found.
(Tr., p.123, Ls.3-25.)
Sergeant Hildebrandt also acknowledged that he found mail addressed to
someone named Rob Jones. (Tr., p.99, Ls.18-24.) He never spoke to Mr. Jones or
made any effort to contact him, despite having learned that Mr. Jones had lived in the
residence before. (Tr., p.100, Ls.1-17.)
Paul Berger, a detective/sergeant with the Idaho State Police, testified next.
(Tr., p.125, Ls.7-13.) He testified that in one of the closets he found a purse that had
residual marijuana in it, and another purse that had a powdered residue resembling
methamphetamine; he also found a glass pipe that he associated with the smoking of
methamphetamine.

(Tr., p.155, Ls.6-15.)

He then found a Crown Royal bag that

contained a pipe and a white crystalline substance. (Tr., p.157, Ls.10-13.) In a drawer,
he found three bottles of "decolorized iodine." (Tr., p.158, Ls.6-11.) All of the iodine
was sealed, meaning it had never been opened. (Tr., p.200, Ls.13-22.) Further, a jug
of decolorized iodine is not concentrated enough to manufacture methamphetamine; a
person either needs a lot of it or more concentrated iodine. (Tr., p.201, L.22 - p.202,
L.11.) Iodine can also, be "legitimately used for cuts and stuff like that." (Tr., p.203,
Ls.12-16.) In the upstairs bathroom, he found pills, some iodine solution, and DayQuil.
(Tr., p.164, Ls.1-4.)
In the basement bathroom, Sergeant Berger found a "gallon jug of a two-layer
liquid." (Tr., p.172, Ls.12-15.) In the fireplace, he found, "matches with the book covers
minus the striker plates, and that's a common way to get red phosphorus in the
manufacturing of methamphetamine." (Tr., p.177, Ls.18-25.) Outside, behind a lattice,
he found muriatic acid.

(Tr., p.182, Ls.4-7.)
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This acid is commonly used to clean

masonry and stone work and was found by two walls that were made of stone.
(Tr., p.209, Ls.15-23.)

Because it was found near a plastic jug, Sergeant Berger

believed the acid and jug were used as a gas generator. (Tr., p.247, Ls.18-23.) Out in
a shed, he found iodine staining and a hotplate. (Tr., p.187, Ls.5-14.) Sergeant Berger
believed that methamphetamine had been manufactured at the residence. (Tr., p.194,
Ls.17-25.)
David Sincerbeaux, a forensic scientist specializing in controlled substances who
works for the Idaho State Police, tested the material found at the residence. (Tr., p.255,
Ls.1-22.)

The top layer of the two-layer liquid found in the basement contained

methamphetamine. (Tr., p.270, Ls.9-11.) He also found evidence of methamphetamine
residue, psilocybin, and marijuana from items taken from the residence. (Tr., p.272, L.1
- p.273, L.25.) He found no ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phosphorus. (Tr., p.282,
Ls.11-25.) The State then rested.
Bonnie Giese, a neighbor the Bergeruds, testified next She lived close enough
to them that, "I can hear if somebody sneezes over there." (Tr., p.296, Ls.9-11.) She
never smelled any chemical-type odors coming from the residence. (Tr., p.297, Ls.1-2.)
Regarding Rob Jones, she knew him well enough to just say hello and knew that he
lived there, and she thought he might have been related to the Bergeruds. (Tr., p.298,
Ls. 7-25.) She also knew that during 2010 the Bergeruds were getting ready for their
daughter's wedding and were doing some renovations on the stone work by the patio.
(Tr., p.299, L.4

p.300, L.2)

Joseph Mazzuca, the CEO of Meth Lab Cleanup Company, which specializes in,
"meth lab remediation, assessment, sampling, training, consultation, et cetera," testified
next. (Tr., p.326, Ls.5-25.) His company performed an assessment of the Bergerud
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residence. (Tr., p.332, Ls.2-13.) He found low levels of methamphetamine throughout
the house and concluded,
In my experience with thousands of properties and data corning in every
day, this - these results for us would be more indicative of meth use and
cross-contamination throughout the property. I didn't see anything here
that would be indicative, based on our experience with meth
manufacturing. Typically, we would see stuff off the charts, hundreds, you
know, things like that.
(Tr., p.380, Ls.17-25.)
Ciera Werner, the friend of the Bergeruds' daughter who was present at the
house on the day of the search, testified that she spent a lot of time at the Bergerud
residence, and the only odor she ever noticed was the smell made by the wood stove.
(Tr., p.459, Ls.20-22.) Alese Simpson, who had known Kathleen since Kathleen was a
teenager, testified that she was at the house on the day of the wedding rehearsal, on
June 26, 2010. (Tr., p.462, L.21 - p.464, L.2.) She "was in the whole house at various
times," including the basement, and never saw anything suspicious or anything that she
thought had anything to do with controlled substances. (Tr., p.464, L.11 - p. 465, L.8.)
Linda Panabaker attended the rehearsal dinner and helped the Bergeruds prepare for
the event; she never noticed anything suspicious at the home. (Tr., p.468, L.2 - p.471
L.9.) She occasionally noticed a paint smell at the house because Kathleen had been
doing some remodeling. (Tr., p.469, Ls.9-14.) She also believed that Rob Jones was
living at the house on the day of the rehearsal because he "helped do the barbecuing
for the reception dinner." (Tr., p.478, Ls.15-21.) She also knew that he lived in the
basement. (Tr., p.481, Ls.13-15.)
Daniel testified next.

On the day of the search, he had worked his shift at a

molding company, got off of work at 7:30 a.m., came home, ate breakfast, and then
tried to get some sleep. (Tr., p.485, Ls.6-10.) When the police arrived he was sleeping
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in the downstairs bedroom because it was difficult to sleep in the day and the basement
was dark and cool. (Tr., p.496, Ls.1-17.) He testified that on the day of the search, he
lived in the residence with just Kathleen and their daughter; his friend, Rob Jones, had
been staying at the house but moved out about four or five days prior to the search.
(Tr., p.498, Ls.2-24.) Mr. Jones still had a number of personal items at the house, and
while he slept in the basement, he had access to the rest of the house, including the
garage and the shed. (Tr., p.499, L.14 - p.500, L.15.)
When the police arrived, Daniel did not know why there were there. (Tr., p.504,
Ls.1-6.) Daniel had no knowledge of any container holding a bi-level liquid and had no
idea what the liquid was.

(Tr., p.525, Ls.3-17.)

Daniel acknowledged making the

pseudoephedrine purchases, and testified that they were for allergies and nasal
congestion: "Pine tree pollen gets me real hard, sulfites in wine and cheese make my
face get dry, and I sneeze when I eat chocolate." (Tr., p.531, Ls.6-9.) As a result, he
took the pills every day. (Tr., p.531, Ls.15-19.) Kathleen and their daughter both use
the medication as well. (Tr., p.532, Ls.1-6.)
Daniel testified that he never used the pseudoephedrine to manufacture
methamphetamine and did not know how to manufacture methamphetamine; he did,
however, acknowledge that he had used methamphetamine one time when someone
told him it could help him get through the graveyard shift at work. (Tr., p.533, Ls.11-15.)
The one time that he used methamphetamine, he used a glass pipe, and put it in an old
fanny pack and forgot about it; this was the evidence seen in State's Exhibits 10-A, 1-E.
and 10-F, which was found at the residence.

(Tr., p.534, L.1 - p.535, L.23.) When

asked if he ever smelled any chemical odors at his residence, Daniel stated that he
painted the stairway and sealed with an oil-based sealer which created a strong odor.
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(Tr., p.538, Ls.6-16.)

He had painted the stairs in February or March and did not

believed the smell was still there in July. (Tr., p.538, Ls. ·t S-25.)
He had also built the shed and had been working on the patio doing rock work.
(Tr., p.539, Ls.15-25.) He testified that he used the muriatic acid on the stone work.
(Tr., p.544, Ls.9-24.) He did not know anything about the two-liter bottle found near the
acid. (Tr., p.546, Ls:t-·13.) Daniel testified that the iodine found in the house was for
the injuries that his dog sustained when it got tangled up in his chain, probably due to a
raccoon. (Tr., p.546, Ls.13-25.) Regarding the matchbooks in the basement fireplace,
Daniel testified that he had not used that fireplace in the summer and had no knowledge
of any matchbooks in either the fireplace or the garbage.

(Tr., p.548, Ls.2-24.)

Regarding the shed where iodine was found on the bench, he testified that he did not
build the workbench and believed that Rob Jones probably had. (Tr., p.551, Ls.15-25.)
Kathleen was the defense's final witness. (Tr., p.6.19, Ls.15-25.) She testified
that she had never manufactured methamphetamine and did not how to manufacture it.
(Tr., p.620, Ls.1-9.) She had measured the length of her driveway as 90 feet; when she
put the garbage out, it was in the, "dead end cul-de-sac past the end of our driveway out
three feet for the requirements that the truck can come and lift it up into the truck."
(Tr., p.630, Ls.11-19.) She also testified that, during the course of the trial, she had
received mail addressed to Rob Jones in her mailbox. (Tr., p.631, Ls.11-20.)
Kathleen testified that she had been diagnosed with fibromyalgia, a chronic pain
disease, and admitted to using marijuana because it helped relieve the pain.
(Tr., p.634, Ls.8-14.) She also admitted to having taken psilocybin mushrooms four or
five years ago, and the baggie was stuffed in the back of a drawer. (Tr., p.647, Ls.1420.)

Kathleen suffered from allergies, which were exacerbated by the fact that she
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owned a flower shop. (Tr., p.635, Ls. 1-12.) The pseudoephedrine was for her allergies.
(Tr., p.635, Ls.13-24.)
Kathleen testified that Rob Jones had lived in their basement, and that he kept a
small refrigerator and a hotplate downstairs.

(Tr., p.639, Ls.7-16.)

She, too, was

unaware of any matchbooks in the fireplace or the bi-layer liquid in the basement.
(Tr., p.645, Ls.1-24.)
The State called Rob Jones as a rebuttal witness. Prior to his testimony, counsel
for the Bergeruds sought an order from the court permitting him to ask Mr. Jones
whether he had previously lied to the police. (Tr., p.678, Ls.9-25.) If Mr. Jones denied
the allegation, counsel wished to impeach him with a misdemeanor conviction for
providing false information to a police officer. (Tr., p.679, Ls.1-4.) The State objected.
(Tr., p.679, Ls.6-21.) The district court ruled as follows:
I think the Rules of Evidence, when it comes to dealing with criminal
involvement to impeach a witness, are pretty well defined under Rule 609
of conviction of a crime. If Mr. Jones was convicted of a crime - and I'll
have to respect the state's representation they have done a records check
and he does not have a felony conviction - if he's not been convicted of a
felony, then it does not appear to the Court that inquiry into his conviction
would be appropriate.
(Tr., p.681, Ls.4-14.) The State then moved to prevent counsel for the Bergeruds from
even asking if Mr. Jones had ever lied to the police. (Tr., p.682 Ls.15-17.) Counsel
responded, "I think it's a proper question. His credibility will be at issue, and if he has
lied to law enforcement and now today he's corning in being called as a witness by law
enforcement, how do we know he's not lying to them today?

I think it goes to his

credibility." (Tr., p.682, L.23 - p.683, L.4.) The court refused to permit any questioning
on this topic, holding,
Well, he's not addressing law enforcement today; he addressing a court of
law. He's testifying in court. And, again, as I pointed out earlier, I don't
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think we impeach a witness by asking them if they've lied to their mothers,
to their brothers, to their aunts, to their uncles.
If you wish to challenge the character of a witness, I think you can do so
by offering evidence of their reputations as to truthfulness. If they have a
reputation that's known in the community as being untruthful, then I think
the Rules of Evidence allow witnesses to present that. But I think specific
instances of incidents they may have lied - now, if in the course of this
investigation, Mr. Jones has made a statement that's different than what
he's offered here in court today, you may have the opportunity to inquire
into that.
(Tr., p.683, Ls.5-24.) Mr. Jones then testified and denied any involvement in any drugrelated activity. (Tr., p.685, L.13 - p.697, L.23.)
Daniel was convicted of all counts except for the possession of psilocybin.
(Tr., p.775, L.13- p.776, L.9.) Kathleen was found guilty of all counts. (Tr., p.776, L.19
- p.777, L.10.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court expressed its belief that the
evidence showed a set of coincidences that would support the verdict. (Tr., p.796, Ls.15.) However, the court was not without reservations:
This case is somewhat disturbing and somewhat unusual because the
Court has had a number of trafficking cases in front of it over the years,
and I can certainly acknowledge that the Bergeruds do not fit the typical
mold, if you would say anything is typical, of the type of offender that
usually is charged with this sort of an offense. In fact, neither of the
defendants have any criminal history of any note at all.
Certainly, both of the defendants have a history of contributing as hardworking members of the community; both have held good jobs; have
supported their families; and, again, have not engaged in the type of
activity that would normally be associated with those that have a tendency
to get involved in manufacturing methamphetamine.
(Tr., p.797, L.15 - p.798, L.8.) The court continued:
One of the things that I think concerned the Court was is that I recognized
that the defendants had not made a direct accusation but certainly inferred
that an individual in their house, Mr. Jones, who had lived in the
basement, may very well have had access and responsibility toward what
was located in the house as opposed to whether it was the Bergeruds'
responsibility.
9

What disturbs the Court a little bit here is, is that Mr. Jones was called as
a state witness at the last minute, was put on for the purposes of rebuttal.
Now, Mr. Jones, of course, testified that he had no knowledge about the
evidence that was located or the processing of methamphetamine, the
evidence that was located within the house.
I found the fact that the state called that witness as a rebuttal witness as a
little bit disturbing, because it would seem to me that if the state is going to
accuse and prosecute somebody for maintaining a methamphetamine
laboratory within a home that their investigator should certainly full and
completely investigate who was living in that home. And it would seem to
me that it would not have taken a whole lot of work to determine that
Mr. Jones was residing in that home and not have to disclose him as a
rebuttal witness at the eleventh hour.

The other thing that would concern the Court is that I would imagine that
before the state put Mr. Jones on the stand, they would have done the
same ephedrine purchase examination of the records, the state records,
that they did of the Bergeruds to discover the purchase of
pseudoephedrine that they had, because if Mr. Jones had been engaged
in multiple purchases of pseudoephedrine, then it would seem to me the
state would be putting a witness on whose credibility would be highly
suspect.
Now, maybe the state has done those things, and trusting the level of
investigation they had and they put Mr. Jones on and it was proper
rebuttal, those areas of the state's case concern the Court.
(Tr., p. 798 L.25 - p.800, L.12.)

When considering the appropriate punishment, the

Court stated that, "the Court will proceed to impose as lenient a sentences as I'm
entitled to . . . ".

(Tr., p.803, Ls.22-25.)

For trafficking in methamphetamine by

manufacture, the court imposed the mandatory minimum of five years fixed. (Tr., p.804,
Ls.13-16.) For conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, the court imposed concurrent
sentences of five years. (Tr., p.804, Ls.17-20.) For manufacturing methamphetamine
in the presence of the child, the court imposed a two-year indeterminate term to be
served consecutively to the previous term of five years fixed.

(Tr., p.804, Ls.21-23.)

For possession of pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture, the court imposed a
two-year indeterminate sentence to run concurrently with the other counts. (Tr., p.805,
10

Ls.1-4.) The court then imposed concurrent sentences of 30 days for the remaining
misdemeanors.

(Tr., p.805, Ls.5-16.)

Thus, the minimum terms that Daniel and

Kathleen will be serving is the mandatory minimum of seven years, with five years fixed.
Daniel and Kathleen appealed, and they assert that the district court erred by
refusing to permit them to inquire into whether Mr. Jones had previously lied to the
police.

11

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to permit the Bergeruds from
inquiring into Mr. Jones's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness?

12

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Permit The Bergeruds From
Inquiring Into Mr. Jones's Character For Truthfulness Or Untruthfulness
The Bergeruds assert that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to
permit them to ask Mr. Jones if he had ever been untruthful with the police.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) controls the admissibility of evidence of specific
instances of a witness's conduct for the purpose of challenging the witness's credibility.
It provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking
or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of crime
as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness
concerning (1) the character of the witness for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of
another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined
has testified.
l.R. E. 608(b).

Whether to admit evidence that is proffered by cross-examination lies

within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90-91 (1993);

State v. Downing, 128 Idaho 149 (Ct. App. 1996). In determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion by disallowing or limiting such cross-examination, this Court
applies the three-part analysis articulated in State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600
(1989).

This test is: whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of

discretion, whether the trial court acted within the bounds of that discretion and
consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether the trial court's decision was
founded on and guided by an exercise of judicial reasoning. Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.
In this case, counsel for the Bergeruds first argued that he should be permitted to
ask Mr. Jones if he had ever lied to the police, and that he should be permitted to
impeach him with evidence of a misdemeanor conviction or providing false information
13

to a police officer if Mr. Jones denied the allegation. (Tr., p.678, L.9 - p.679, L.4.) The
district court ruled that, pursuant to l.R.E. 609, impeachment by the evidence of the
conviction would not be permitted. (Tr., p.681, Ls.4-14.) The Bergeruds do not take
issue with this part of the district court's ruling, as the misdemeanor conviction does not
meet the criteria for admissibility of a prior conviction under l.R.E. 609.
However, the State then sought to preclude the Bergeruds from even asking
Mr. Jones if he had ever lied to the police, without introducing evidence of the
misdemeanor conviction. (Tr., p.682 Ls.15-17.) The court ruled,
Well, he's not addressing law enforcement today; he addressing a court of
law. He's testifying in court. And, again, as I pointed out earlier, I don't
think we impeach a witness by asking them if they've lied to their mothers,
to their brothers, to their aunts, to their uncles.
If you wish to challenge the character of a witness, I think you can do so
by offering evidence of their reputations as to truthfulness. If they have a
reputation that's known in the community as being untruthful, then I think
the Rules of Evidence allow witnesses to present that. But I think specific
instances of incidents they may have lied - now, if in the course of this
investigation, Mr. Jones has made a statement that's different than what
he's offered here in court today, you may have the opportunity to inquire
into that.
(Tr., p.683, Ls.5-24.) The Bergeruds assert that the district court erred in this regard.
First, the district court abused its discretion because the court did not perceive
that it had the discretion to permit the Bergeruds' inquiry. The district court interpreted
Rule 608 to only allow a witness's credibility to attacked by offering reputation evidence,
and that specific instances of conduct could not be inquired into. (Tr., p.683, Ls.5-24.)
Thus, the district court concluded that specific instances of conduct could only be
inquired into by reputation evidence, where the rule specifically provides that, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, specific instances of conduct may be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning (1) the character of the
14

witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified. See l.R.E. 608(b). Because the district court did not perceive
that specific instances of conduct could be inquired into (without proof by extrinsic
evidence) on cross examination if they were probative for truthfulness, the court did not
perceive it had discretion to permit the Bergeruds' inquiry.

The district court thus

abused its discretion. See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.
However, even if this Court concludes that the district court perceived the issue
as one of discretion, the Bergeruds assert that the court did not reach its conclusion
through an exercise of reason.

See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600. First, the Bergeruds

assert that providing false information to a police officer is relevant to the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of a witness.

In this case, the district court equated

Mr. Jones's alleged conduct to lying to one's family.
This is faulty reasoning.

The Bergeruds submit that most people have been

somewhat untruthful to family members at some point in their lifetime, about things that
may be either important or trivial, and therefore being untruthful to a family member at
some point in someone's past would not be particularly probative of a person's
character for truthfulness.

Lying to a police officer, however, is different.

It is not a

crime to be untruthful to one's mother, where, apparently, Mr. Jones had been untruthful
with the police to such a serious extent that he was charged with a crime. While the
circumstances of Mr. Jones's conviction are not in the record, the only assumption that
can be made is that Mr. Jones's representations to the officer were not in regard to a
trivial matter because charges were filed.
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This Court has recognized that some crimes are directly connected to a person's
veracity and credibility.

In the felony context of l.R.

felonies into categories.

Crimes in the first category, such as perjury, are intimately

609, this Court has divided

connected to a person's veracity and credibility, while crimes in the second category,
like robbery and burglary, are somewhat less relevant to credibility because they do not
deal directly with veracity and have only a general relationship with honesty. State v.
Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 580-81, 634 P.2d 435, 442-43 (1981); State v. Grist, 152 Idaho

786, 789 (Ct App. 2012). Providing false information to a police officer, like perjury, is
directly connected to a person's veracity and credibility.
Finally, Mr. Jones's credibility was critical in this case.

The district court

recognized this fact at the sentencing hearing. (Tr., p. 798 L.25 - p.800, L.12.) As set
forth in the above Statement of Facts, the district court, in great detail, expressed its
dissatisfaction with the State's investigation of Mr. Jones, and specifically wondered if
the State had put on a witness, "whose credibility would be highly suspect." (Tr., p.800,
Ls.5-7.)
The Bergeruds acknowledge that they could not introduce extrinsic evidence of a
specific instance of conduct in this case. However, they should have been permitted,
on cross-examination of Mr. Jones, to inquire into his character for truthfulness by
asking whether he had ever lied to a police officer. Such an act would directly affect his
veracity and credibility, and would therefore be probative of his character for
truthfulness. Because the district court failed to perceive the issue as one of discretion,
and, even if it did, did not reach its conclusion through an exercise of reason, the
Bergeruds submit that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to permit them
to ask Mr. Jones if he had ever been untruthful with the police.
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CONCLUSION
The Bergeruds request that their convictions be vacated and their cases
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of November, 2012.

Public Defender
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